The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance? by Eichengreen, Barry & Wyplosz, Charles
The Stability and Growth Pact will lead member countries to aim for
cyclically balanced budgets. Until this steady state is reached, Europe will
continue its efforts at decit cutting. While so doing, politicians are less likely
to undertake the difcult labour market reforms that are really needed. Is
further scal retrenchment wise? The paper reviews the reasons that have
been advanced in favour of a Stability Pact and nds them wanting. The
most serious justications, such as the systemic risk of bank crisis following
a governments failure to service its debt, can be better dealt with in other
ways: for example, by prudential limits on banks exposure to public debts.
Moreover, our analysis reveals that the macroeconomic costs of the Stability
Pact, while sizeable, are not as dangerous as often believed. The costs will
be barely visible once the steady state is reached. The true macroeconomic
costs are front loaded; they concern the next few years, after a decade already
dominated by convergence efforts.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Maastricht Treaty provides the institutional framework for Europes monetary
union. Its essential features have been the subject of extensive discussion: these
include the three-step transition, the creation of a European Central Bank,
procedures for shaping the conduct of scal policy (the Excessive Decit and
Mutual Surveillance Procedures of Art. 103, 104 and 109) and the no-bailout rule
prohibiting the ECB from acquiring public debt directly from the issuer (Art. 104 of
the treaty and Art. 21 of the Protocol on the European System of Central Banks).
The one post-Maastricht element, nalized at the June 1997 meeting of the
European Council in Amsterdam, is the Pact for Stability and Growth. 1 The pact
claries the provisions of the Excessive Decit Procedure. It calls for scal
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1 The growth part was added at the request of the French authorities as a face-saving device after they were forced to
soften their previous opposition.
positions to be balanced or in surplus in normal times so that automatic stabilizers
can operate. It urges stronger surveillance of medium-term scal positions with the
goal of providing an early warning signal that the 3% reference value for budget
decits is at risk. It claries the conditions under which participants in the
monetary union will be allowed to exceed the 3% decit ceiling without being
determined to have an excessive decit. Countries will be automatically exempt
only if their GDPs have declined by 2% and the excess decit is temporary and
small. Those in which GDP declines by between 0.75% and 2% could also be
exempt, but only with the concurrence of the Council of Ministers. Countries with
even milder recessions will be found to have an excessive decit and forced to
make mandatory deposits that are transformed into nes if the scal excess is not
eliminated within two years.
Although this new transparency is welcome, it also reveals a more restrictive set of
provisions than those laid down by the Maastricht Treaty. The treaty says only that
the general government decit may not exceed its reference value (3% of GDP)
unless the decit has declined signicantly and continuously to where it is close to
that reference value, or the excess of the reference value is only exceptional and
temporary and the decit remains close to the reference value. It says nothing, in
other words, about the size of the output decline producing that exceptional and
temporary excess decit, or the period over which it must occur. In this sense the
Stability Pact implies less exibility than the Maastricht Treaty. 
The Stability Pact has not received the same systematic analysis as other aspects
of the Maastricht Treaty.2 Providing that analysis is our purpose in this paper.
Our conclusion is that the Stability Pact will have some effect. Governments will
adjust their scal policies just enough to avoid incurring nes. EU authorities for
their part will give countries just enough leeway to avoid having to ne them.
Actually imposing nes would worsen conditions in the adversely affected member
state, lead to recrimination and deal a blow to EU solidarity. Actually incurring nes
would subject a government to serious embarrassment and loss of political face.
Hence, the pact is likely to alter scal behaviour just enough to avoid these
outcomes.
This will reduce the extent of automatic stabilization. Estimates based on
historical data suggest that automatic stabilization may increase in the output gap,
but by only a fraction of a percentage point. Hence the minor nuisance of the title.
But even a fraction of a percentage point on the growth rate can become important
when allowed to accumulate over time. Our simulations suggest that, after
accumulation over the last two decades, levels of real output would have ended 5%
lower in France and the UK, and 9% lower in Italy.
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2 See, however, Artis and Winkler (1997), Beetsma and Uhlig (1997) and Buti et al. (1997).
The critical question, therefore, is how hamstrung automatic stabilizers will be.
Will the Stability Pact weaken them as much in the future as it would have in the
past, had it been superimposed on actual experience? The answer hinges on how far
below the 3% ceiling budget decits are when Stage III begins. If budgets move
signicantly into surplus relative to past experience, there is no reason why
automatic stabilizers will be much affected. But in the present climate, where
electorates lack the appetite for further spending cuts, signicantly smaller decits
require signicantly faster growth. The danger is thus that the Stability Pact
will divert effort from the fundamental reforms needed to step up the pace.
In  particular, without fundamental labour market reform, Europe will fail to
grow  by at least 331_2% a year, and decits will not decline. The Stability Pact
will grow more binding, and the operation of Europes automatic stabilizers will
remain feeble, increasing the volatility of output, further depressing growth, and
making the provisions of the pact even more binding than before. Through the
operation of this vicious spiral, Europe could be condemned to a low-level
equilibrium trap.
Our view is that leaders have a xed amount of political capital that they can
allocate to politically costly scal reform or politically costly labour market reform.
To the extent that they invest in one, they have fewer resources left to devote to the
other. In practice, they are likely to compromise, doing a little of each. For example,
those European countries that have made the most progress in eliminating budget
decits and increasing labour market exibility (Ireland and Finland spring to mind)
have allocated their adjustment effort evenly to scal consolidation and labour
market reform.
Our conclusion will be that the Stability Pact may have some slight benets in
terms of scal discipline, but may have signicant costs, both in diverting political
effort from more fundamental problems and indeed in making those fundamental
problems worse than before.
2. WHAT THE STABILITY PACT SAYS
The Stability Pact consists of two Council regulations, one on the Excessive Decit
Procedure and another on surveillance, and a European Council resolution that
provides guidance to the Council and member states on the application of the pact.
The two Council regulations have the force of law. They clarify the meaning of the
Maastricht Treatys provisions regarding excessive decits, in particular in respect of
exceptional and temporary circumstances under which the 3% reference value for
the general government decit can be exceeded without a determination that the
decit is excessive. In addition, under the pacts provisions, participants in the
monetary union commit themselves to a medium-term budgetary stance close to
balance or surplus.
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The pact will consider a decit in excess of 3% to be exceptional if a countrys
GDP declines by at least 2% in the year in question. In addition, a recession in
which real GDP declines by less than 2% but more than 0.75% may qualify with the
concurrence of the Council. The country will have to show that its recession was
exceptional in terms of its abruptness or in relation to past output trends. Countries
with annual output declines smaller than 0.75% will not be able to claim exceptional
circumstances. These provisions thus clarify the Maastricht Treatys clauses
regarding the exceptional circumstances under which the 3% reference value can be
exceeded without leading to the determination of an excessive decit.
The pact also includes provisions concerning further exemptions. While countries
are obliged to correct excessive decits as quickly as possible after their emergence
and to launch the corrective budgetary adjustments they deem necessary without
delay, they will probably be able to run decits in excess of 3% of GDP for at least
two years in a row without incurring nes. The Commission will receive denitive
data that a countrys decit in year t exceeded 3% around March of year t + 1. By
the end of May it will have issued a recommendation for eliminating that excess in
accordance with Article 103(4). The country will then have to take corrective action
such that the excess is eliminated by year t + 2. If no corrective action is taken by the
end of year t + 1, nancial sanctions will be imposed. But presumably corrective
action that will eliminate the excess in year t + 2 will sufce to eliminate this threat.
Thus, two successive years of budget decits in excess of 3% (and possibly more 
see below) will be permitted.
Moreover, the passage specifying these time limits ends with the qualifying phrase
unless there are special circumstances. The nature of those special circumstances is
not specied. But presumably a country like Finland in the early 1990s, which
suffered budgetary difculties reecting special circumstances largely beyond its
control, would be allowed to take even longer to bring its decit back down to 3%.
Nor does the pact clarify a third provision of the Excessive Decit Procedure, that
the budget must remain close to the reference value to avoid the determination of
an excessive decit.
Sanctions, when required, will take the form of non-remunerated deposits, which
start at 0.2% of GDP and rise by one-tenth of the excess decit up to a maximum of
0.5% of GDP. Additional deposits will be required each year until the excessive
decit is corrected. If the excess is not corrected within two years, the deposit will be
converted into a ne; otherwise it will be returned.
Thus, a careful reading does not imply that nes will be levied as soon as budget
decits exceed 3% of GDP. The pact is rather more exible. It allows temporary
exemptions for countries experiencing severe recessions. More generally, it allows
time for excessive decits to be corrected; in the case of undened special
circumstances it allows unspecied amounts of time. Clearly, one needs to think
harder about the political economy of EU policy making to forecast how strictly the
nes and sanctions of the Stability Pact will be applied.
70 BARRY EICHENGREEN AND CHARLES WYPLOSZ
3. RATIONALES FOR THE STABILITY PACT
For an argument favouring the Stability Pact to convince, it must satisfy three
conditions. The effect on which it hinges must be rst order (on the principle that
controversial policies with potentially important side-effects should not be adopted in
response to negligible problems). It must have Europe-wide repercussions (on the
principle that, if its effects are purely national, there is no justication for a Europe-
wide response). And, arguably, it must be a consequence of monetary union rather
than a corollary of European integration (on the principle that the Excessive Decit
Procedure and the rest of the Maastricht Treaty apply to member states whether in
or out of the monetary union, whereas the sanctions of the Stability Pact apply
specically to participants in EMU).3
3.1. To prevent inationary debt bailouts
The most compelling argument for the Stability Pact is as extra protection for the
ECB from pressure for an inationary debt bailout. The scenario might run as
follows. The government of an EMU country gets into scal trouble, from which it
cannot extricate itself. Investors fear suspension or (more likely) modication of
payment on its public debt , and therefore sell its bonds. Its bond prices start to
plummet. Banks holding those bonds nd their capital impaired, inciting depositor
runs. Bond markets (and indirectly banks) in other EMU countries suffer adverse
repercussions, as investors in public debt of other European states become
demoralized. To prevent the collapse of Europes banking and nancial system, the
ECB buys up the bonds of the government in distress. As the costs are being borne
by the residents of the EMU zone as a whole rather than the citizens of the
responsible country, governments have an incentive to run riskier policies in the rst
place, and investors have less reason to apply market discipline.
This scenario is more than hypothetical: in 19945 something similar occurred in
Mexico (see Box 1). But is it relevant to Europe? Recent debt problems, not just in
Mexico but in Thailand, South Korea and elsewhere, suggest that the monetary
authorities (the ECB in Europe, the IMF in the broader international context) come
under intense pressure to extend a debt bailout when two conditions hold: debt
problems place the banking system at risk; and they threaten to spread contagiously
to other national markets.4 Banks are the weak link in the chain of macroeconomic
and nancial stability: their core business, maturity transformation, renders them
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3 The point is arguable because other pact provisions, such as medium-term surveillance and the precise conditions
under which a decit will be found as excessive, will apply to EU countries whether or not in EMU.
4 The probability of bailouts is further enhanced by serious imbalances in the vertical structure of taxation and
spending, when the centre collects the taxes but subcentral governments receive transfers and do the spending. This
works against the likelihood of a debt bailout in Europe, where member states collect the bulk of their own taxes, and
where transfers from the EU remain relatively small. We develop these points further in Box 2.
illiquid. Operating in an environment of asymmetric information, they are
vulnerable to runs when depositors lack condence. The Great Depression reminds
us that widespread bank failures can have serious macroeconomic repercussions.
Contagion provides major motivation for IMF intervention in countries like
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Box 1. Should Stability Pact proponents fear that Europe will be
another Mexico?
A precedent for the bailout scenario feared by European policy-makers is the
Mexican crisis of 19945 (for an overview and analysis on which we draw, see
Sachs et al., 1995). That episode points to four factors that magnify bailout risk.
First, a signicant share of Mexican public debt, the notorious tesobonos, was
foreign-currency indexed. Since the Bank of Mexico could not print dollars and
was committed to holding the exchange rate within a band, once investors began
selling its bonds, the Mexican government was in the same predicament as a
member of a monetary union. It could purchase what was being sold only in so
far as it possessed dollar reserves. Since its reserves were limited, it had to solicit a
bailout from the USA and the IMF.
Second, much of Mexicos debt was short term. The tesobonos and their
domestic-currency equivalents, cetes, ran only 30, 60 or 90 days to maturity. Not
only did the government have to service its debts, but it had to redeem a
signicant quantity if investors failed to roll them over. Since it lacked the dollars
to do so and might print pesos to nance redemptions, the spectre of ination
loomed. Doubts about the governments willingness or ability to service its debts
could therefore ignite a run.
Third, signicant quantities of public debt were held by the Mexican banking
system, whose stability was critical for the macroeconomy. The outbreak of the
crisis was followed immediately by withdrawals by domestic and foreign
depositors. Fear of collapse of the banking system was a powerful motive for the
rescue by the USA and IMF.
Fourth, there were fears of contagion. The Mexican crisis led to extensive
reserve losses and deposit withdrawals in Argentina and repercussions as far aeld
as Thailand, Hong Kong and Sweden. US ofcials cited danger of contagion and
systemic risk as a rationale for the Mexican bailout.
Each of these points has an analogy in EMU. National central banks will be
mere operating arms of the ECB, unable to print euros. Some candidates for
EMU have signicant amounts of short-term debt, held in important part by the
banking system. And as European banking systems and nancial markets more
generally become increasingly integrated and interdependent, worries of
contagion will grow.
STABILITY PACT 73
Box 2. Sooner or later? When will bailout risk be greatest?
At what stage in the construction of EMU will bailout risk be greatest?
McKinnon (1996) suggests it will be most intense at the start; von Hagen and
Eichengreen (1996) argue that bailout risk will be least at the outset.
McKinnons conclusion follows from assuming that bailout risk is minimized
when four conditions are met:
 monetary separation (the government neither owns nor controls the central bank).
Monetary separation hardens budget constraints, discouraging governments
from recklessly accumulating debts.
 scal separation (little co-mingling of revenues of different levels of government,
so lower levels of government cannot expect additional transfers from higher
levels when they overspend). When lower levels of government receive
transfers, their budget constraints are softened, and they may be tempted to
run reckless scal policies.
 factor mobility, intensifying tax competition and limiting the size of the public
sector. This, in McKinnons view, will limit the size of the public sector debts
that member states accumulate.5
 low debt/GNP ratios, so that governments do not pressurize the monetary
authorities to use the ination tax on optimal-taxation grounds.6
The rst three conditions will be met from the outset. The single market, by
encouraging factor mobility, will intensify tax competition. No national
government will have its own central bank. Revenue sharing will be minimal. If
there is bailout risk, it will arise from failure to meet the nal condition, a failure
that will be most egregious in the short run. This implies that the need for the
Stability Pact is most pressing in the early years of EMU but less so subsequently
(when debt overhangs have been removed).
Von Hagen and Eichengreen emphasize that bailout risk will depend on the
vertical structure of the tax base: in other words, on the extent to which
subcentral  in the context of EMU, member state  governments collect their
own taxes versus relying on transfers from the centre. Contrast two situations. In
scenario A, all taxes are raised by a central government that provides grants to
subcentral governments. If a subcentral government experiences difculties, its
Continued
5 The counterargument, which we regard as more plausible, is that tax competition will put downward pressure
on revenues, but its impact on expenditure may be less than one for one. For this reason it may be associated with
larger decits and debts, not smaller ones.
6 A clear analysis of how high debt burdens lead governments to press for use of the ination tax in the Ramsey
model is De Grauwe (1996).
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Box 2. continued
only options are to default or obtain a bailout. If default is not politically
palatable, then a bailout will be forthcoming. A subcentral government that
knows this will have an incentive to run risky policies.
In scenario B, subcentral governments control their own taxes. If they
experience difculties, they can be asked to raise the tax rates they control,
reinforcing their nancial position. Since in this case there exists a lower-cost
alternative to default, the central bank can credibly promise not to provide a
bailout.7
It follows that pressure for a bailout will be intense in the early years of EMU.
The European Union lacks a highly developed system of scal federalism. Its
budget is small, and the vast majority is earmarked for the common agricultural
policy and Structural Funds (leaving it unavailable for treating debt- and decit-
related problems). The member states control the taxes levied on their citizens.
This will give national governments a third, low-cost, alternative to default and
bailout: namely, adjusting their own tax rates to redress their own nancial
problems. The ECB, aware of the existence of this third alternative, should be
able to resist the pressure for a bailout.
Eventually there may develop pressure for a European system of scal
federalism to smooth the operation of the monetary union, in which case the
vertical structure of the tax base will be transformed and with it the severity of
bailout risk. But this is a long-run prospect. Thus, in contrast to McKinnon, who
sees bailout risk as most intense in the short run, von Hagen and Eichengreen
and the present authors see it as more pressing later.
Correctly choosing between these models is important, for erroneously
accepting one could aggravate the very problems forecast by the other. Say that
one accepts McKinnons interpretation and adopts strict limits on scal policy. If
member states are then prevented from operating their automatic scal stabilizers
in response to business-cycle disturbances, they will press the EU to do so for
them. They will lobby for an expanded EU budget with automatic-stabilization
capacity and transfers from the EU to the member states. Ultimately this could
lead to precisely the bailout problem about which the proponents of the Stability
Pact are so concerned.
7 Von Hagen and Eichengreen test this hypothesis by estimating a probit regression on cross-country data for
19857. The presence or absence of scal restrictions on subcentral governments, which will be needed where
bailout risk is most intense, is modelled as a function of the share of subcentral government spending nanced out
of own taxes. (Per-capita income is also included as a control.) The results conrm that the vertical structure of
taxation matters for the incidence of scal restrictions and by implication for bailout risk.
Mexico, Thailand and South Korea; if a crisis in one country has major inter-
national externalities that national policy-makers have little incentive to internalize,
there is an obvious argument for multilateral intervention (in the European case, by
the ECB).
We take seriously the rationale for the Stability Pact based on the spectre of an
inationary debt bailout. But the Maastricht Treaty already contains a no-bailout
rule that prohibits the ECB from purchasing public debt directly from the issuer. To
justify reinforcing this rule with a Stability Pact, it is necessary to show that the
factors heightening bailout risk   threats to the banking system and bond market
contagion  will operate in EMU: in other words, that the risks to Europes banking
system and bond markets are sufciently intense that the ECB will be unable to resist
importuning by heavily indebted countries. We provide evidence on these questions
below.
3.2. To neutralize inationary pressure more generally
A second popular rationale for the Stability Pact is to offset other sources of
inationary pressure. The ECB, concerned to maximize economic efciency, will
seek to balance the deadweight cost of the ination tax against the deadweight cost
of other taxes. Where the total resources required by the public sector are large, all
taxes, including the ination tax, will be high. If governments of EMU countries
run large decits and accumulate high debts, the ECB will permit more inationary
monetary policies to reduce the deadweight losses associated with other taxes. Since
product and factor market taxes fall on the residents of each country, while the
ination tax will be shifted to the residents of the whole euro zone, national
incentives to run decits will be increased by EMU membership.
This analysis, as in De Grauwe (1996), presupposes that the ECB will be simply a
Stackelberg follower to the scal lead of different member governments. However,
there are convincing reasons to think that the ECB will not act as a myopic follower
of scal fashion, but will engage in a repeated game in which it seeks to convince
governments and markets of the credibility of its commitment to price stability. It
will keep ination low even if this means that other taxes have to be higher.8
Governments, nding the deadweight loss of taxation to be higher, may then pursue
lower government spending. They will be Stackelberg followers, not leaders.
Thus, there is good reason to think that any ination bias in ECB policies
produced on optimal taxation grounds will be small. This is a weak reed, hardly rst
order in magnitude, on which to rest any justication for the Stability Pact.
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8 If EMU members appoint independent central bankers who attach overriding importance to the goal of price
stability, even a myopic ECB will be reluctant to trade off higher ination tax revenue for reductions in distortions
from other sources of tax revenue.
3.3. To offset political bias towards excessive decits
A third widely voiced rationale for the Stability Pact is to offset Europes bias
towards excessive decits (Beetsma and Uhlig, 1997). Years of decit spending have
saddled governments with debt/GDP ratios in excess of 70%. High debts make the
public nances more fragile, reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy (Giavazzi et
al., 1997), increase scal crowding out (since additional government spending, by
raising interest rates, thereby raises debt service costs), raise the deadweight cost of
taxation, and make funding social security liabilities more difcult.
The solution is to move Europes budgets towards balance sufciently to stabilize
the debt/income ratio or to allow it to decline. Thus, the Stability Pact sees Europes
budgets as broadly balanced or in modest surplus in expansions, with decits
widening to as much as 3% of GDP in contractions. With real GDP growing at
23% per year, this should sufce for debt/income ratios to fall over the medium
run.
The obvious objection to this rationale for the Stability Pact is that it suppresses
the symptoms without eradicating the disease. If EU policy-makers fail to remove
the underlying disorder   identied by the institutional school9 as excessively
decentralized scal procedures that aggravate free-rider problems  then imposing
numerical caps on budget decits only encourages devious behaviour to meet the
letter but not the spirit of the law. We need only note the operation of the Excessive
Decit Procedure. While some progress has been made in curbing decits in Stage
II, the EDP has also encouraged scal ddles like refundable euro taxes, sales of
central bank gold reserves and one-off appropriations of public enterprise reserves. It
remains to be seen how much recent progress is sustainable. Pessimists (including
one of the authors) worry that, in the absence of an effective remedy for the
underlying disorder, Maastricht fatigue will set in once countries are admitted to
EMU, as refundable euro taxes are refunded and, more generally, as countries
previously forced to suck in their stomachs to squeeze into Maastrichts tightly
tailored trousers then expel their breath violently.10
However, suppressing the symptoms is standard practice when the disease is
untreatable. Doctors administer powerful pain-killers to patients with untreatable
cancers. If excessive decits can be prevented only by using the EUs authority to
impose a credible external constraint, there is no reason not to try.
3.4. To internalize international interest rate spillovers
Another popular justication for the Stability Pact is to internalize the cross-border
interest rate spillovers associated with uncoordinated scal policies. Policy-makers,
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in this view, have inadequate incentive to take into account the impact of their
borrowing on interest rates in other member states when formulating their national
scal policies. The Excessive Decit Procedure and the Stability Pact offset this bias.
However, European countries borrow in global not national nancial markets: it is
unclear how scal policy in Italy and Spain has signicant effects on interest rates in
Germany or France.
Even if they did, in the absence of other distortions, changes in interest rates are
purely redistributive. They redistribute income from debtors to creditors, within and
across EU states. Table 1 suggests that higher interest rates would mean redistribu-
tion from the Nordic countries, Spain and Italy towards Germany and the Benelux
countries. Ironically, core members of the future EMU should be the last countries
to worry about redistributive effects of high interest rates! In any case, in so far as
these externalities are pecuniary, they do not warrant intervention on standard
efciency grounds (Buiter et al., 1993). 
Of course, in the presence of other distortions, such as rigid wages, changes in
interest rates can have cross-border effects on the level of output and employment.
But these are unlikely to be signicant, not least because two effects substantially
offset one another: decit spending at home boosts the demand for imports and
therefore output and employment in neighbouring countries, but also drives up
interest rates and therefore depresses output and employment abroad. The two
effects roughly cancel out (Oudiz and Sachs, 1984).
At this stage, this case for the pact is unproven: we return to the evidence in
section 6.
3.5. To encourage policy co-ordination
A fth argument for the pact invokes the advantages of policy co-ordination in an
integrated Europe. It is desirable both that national scal policies be co-ordinated (as
explained in section 3.3) and that monetary and scal policies be co-ordinated with
one another. A bad policy mix of loose scal policy and tight monetary policy may
lead to high real interest rates, low investment, a chronically overvalued exchange
rate and slow growth (Debrun, 1997). Medium-term surveillance under the pact will
serve the useful purpose of focusing European governments attention on the need
for a balanced policy mix.
Not only do most studies of policy co-ordination suggest, however, that the
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Table 1. Net foreign assets, 1994 (% of GDP)
Sweden 57 Austria 12 Germany 10
Finland 56 Italy 11 Belgium 11
Denmark 29 France 7 Netherlands 26
Spain 20 UK 2
Source: OECD.
benets are slight, but numerical decit limits like those of the Stability Pact are far
from an ideal basis for encouraging policy co-ordination. By limiting the exibility
of national scal policies, they may actually impede efforts to co-ordinate policies. In
the long run, the non-cooperative equilibrium in recessions is as likely to be
inadequately expansionary budgets as excessively expansionary budgets, with
European countries failing to take into account the locomotive effects of their decit
spending on neighbouring states (much like the states of the USA). Numerical decit
ceilings are the wrong instrument for addressing the general problem. If the Stability
Pact is seen as a way of putting esh on the bones of the Mutual Surveillance
Procedure of the Maastricht Treaty (Art. 103, under which the Council develops
guidelines for the economic policies of member states, monitors their performance
and issues recommendations), then it is misguided.
3.6. Summing up
The most compelling rationale for the Stability Pact rests on the need to buttress the
no-bailout rule of the Maastricht Treaty. That need will be most pressing where
debt problems place banking systems at risk and where bond market contagion is
pervasive. It is to these questions that we therefore turn.
4. WOULD A DEBT RUN DESTABILIZE EUROPES BANKING SYSTEM?
Imagine a heavily indebted government, which, unable to borrow in the markets
and subject to the no-bailout rule for the ECB and EU institutions, has to default.
Its bond prices collapse, causing a loss of asset values for commercial banks holding
this debt. Fears that banks are at risk triggers runs by depositors (King, 1997).
Although this crisis originates in one country, banks in other countries are linked by
the interbank market, and by payments and settlement systems. In the worst-case
scenario, banking panic infects much of Europe, leading the ECB to monetize debt
to prevent a meltdown.
EMU membership may alter the incentives of governments in undesirable ways.
When rescue operations are conducted by national central banks, the domestic
taxpayer ultimately foots the bill. Within EMU the burden will be borne by EMU
taxpayers. In effect, the defaulting country will obtain a transfer from its fellow
EMU members. This ability to shift the bill provides a perverse incentive to run
risky policies. The role of the Stability Pact, in this view, is to limit moral hazard.
How likely is a debt crisis to infect the banking system? How exposed are banks to
public debt? Data on public debt holdings by banks are hard to obtain. Table 2
shows data for 1992. We focus on national public debt as a share of bank assets (in
the rst panel), although the picture is essentially the same when we consider bank
holdings of public debt as a percentage of GDP (in the second panel). The share of
public debt in bank portfolios tends to be higher where the government is heavily
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Table 2. Bank exposure to national public debt (NPD) and real estate loans (REL), 1992
Bank holdings % of bank assets % of GDP % of public debt Memo item:
Public debt as % of GDP
NPD REL NPD REL NPD REL
Austria 23 48 52
Finland 39
France 1 14 2 19 5 39
Germany 4 9 31 34
Greece 9 12 105
Ireland 8 6 11 8 12 8 92
Italy 17 20 19 106
Netherlands 11 17 62
Norway 2 32 1 25 42 108 23
Spain 12 14 17 20 42 48 41
Sweden 2 35 3 71 8 160 67
Switzerland 29 72 16
UK 1 10 2 24 3 70 34
Notes: For Ireland real estate is personal house mortgage nance; for Sweden data concern all credit
institutions. Final column refers to central government debt.
Source: National central banks; government statistical yearbooks.
11 Central government debt is 12% of bank assets in Spain and 8% in Ireland, yet such debt is 105% of GDP in
Ireland, but only 23% in Spain.
12 These are averages for all banks (for more details, see Dalheim et al., 1992).
indebted, as in Italy and the Netherlands, although there are exceptions to the
rule.11
How much public debt is too much? One comparison is with house price
uctuations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, exposure to which created serious
problems for European nancial institutions; in Nordic countries it forced
governments to rescue the banks. Table 2 compares bank exposure to real estate
loans with bank exposure to public debt. By this measure, exposure to public debt is
not obviously a problem. At the time of the Nordic crisis in 1992, the BIS estimates
that the share of bad loans in banks portfolios was 7.7% in Finland, 8.3% in
Sweden and 9.3% in Norway (BIS, 1993). Suppose we conclude that the loss of 5%
of bank assets was enough to cause severe distress and force the authorities to
intervene.12  Were a government fully to default on its debt, exposure of 5% or more
would be dangerous. Of course, governments rarely repudiate their debts; more
typically they restructure, limiting capital losses for bondholders. Even if the capital
loss associated with restructuring were 50% of the face value of the debt, only bank
exposure in excess of 10% would be dangerous. By this measure, only Italy and
Spain face signicant risk of bank failure for debt-related reasons.
Debt default could still be a problem if the banks customers rather than the
banks themselves hold the bulk of the debt. Default might incite households and
non-bank rms holding bonds to scramble for liquidity, and the ensuing withdrawal
of deposits might create liquidity problems. It is instructive to consider the response
of the Federal Reserve to the collapse of stock prices in 1929 and again in 1987. In
both instances monetary policy was eased despite the fact that US nancial
institutions directly held only small amounts of stock. The Feds fear on both
occasions was that nancial distress would lead to defaults by brokers and other
bank customers that would impair the capital position of the banks. In both cases,
however, the liquidity injected into the nancial system was smoothly withdrawn
once the crisis passed; the consequences were deationary, not inationary.13
Similarly, banking crises in Sweden, Norway and Finland and serious problems for
the banking system in France, Spain and Switzerland were all associated with
deation, not ination, despite pervasive intervention by governments to rescue the
banking system.
5. WOULD DEFAULT BY AN EMU MEMBER DEMORALIZE EMU BOND
MARKETS?
A second channel through which debt problems in one jurisdiction can spill over to
another is contagion in the bond market itself. If information is asymmetric, one
debtors default may lead investors to revise downwards their expectations of
maintenance of debt service by others. Debtors will nd themselves having to accept
higher yields to place new issues or to induce investors to roll over maturing ones. In
so far as adverse consequences follow for the entire European bond market and not
just the market in assets of the country in which the problem originates, pressure for
the ECB to head off the problem will be intense.
This seems unlikely in Europe. Compared, say, to Latin America, information
about governments willingness and ability to pay is relatively complete. It is unlikely
that default or near default by one EMU country will per se lead investors to sharply
higher expectations of default in another. This is logically distinct from the question
of what might cause debt problems in an EMU country (election of a scally
irresponsible politician, an asymmetric shock or an asymmetric response to a
common shock); here we are concerned not with the causes of default, but with the
scope for contagion.
From this point of view, a good analogy for post-EMU Europe may be the US
market in state and municipal bonds. Not only is information relatively complete, 14
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13 Subsequent research has found no role for scal proigacy in either crisis; indeed, scholarly accounts of the Great
Depression blame excessively contractionary monetary policy. Neither suggests that a stability pact would have been
helpful.
14 Especially in so far as tax advantages lead the vast majority of a states bonds to be held by its residents, who are in a
good position to monitor the states economy and government.
but the USA is also a monetary union and individual states lack individual central
banks to underpin their bond markets. The US market for state bonds has been
analysed extensively: Goldstein and Woglom (1994) and Bayoumi et al. (1995) have
studied yield spreads on state bonds issued between 1981 and the 1990s.
An objection to the use of these state and municipal data is that they pertain to
lightly indebted governments. Both because 49 of the 50 state governments operate
subject to statutory and constitutional scal constraints of varying severity and
because their tax bases are relatively mobile, they have a limited capacity to incur
and support high volumes of debt. Gross state debt to gross state product ratios are
around 3%, far below the 70% debt ratio that characterizes the EU. Without
substantial debts, US states have not experienced substantial debt problems; one
would not expect to observe contagion. Yet US states rely on a smaller tax base than
the European governments. Table 3 shows statistics on the ratio of public debts to
the tax base (approximated by public spending). The difference between the two sets
of governments remain sizeable, but less than the debt/income ratios.
While this objection has merit, US data are the only game in town. Nor is it true
that statutory and constitutional restrictions prevented states and municipalities
from running into trouble   recall New York City in the 1970s and Orange County
in the 1990s. US states might have light debt loads, but having highly mobile tax
bases, they also have limited capacity to raise taxes once a scal problem arises.
Bayoumi et al. (1995) estimate that states get rationed out of the capital market when
their debt/gross state product ratios approach 9%.
5.1. Event-study analysis
If contagion is present in a bond market like the USA, it may be a danger in post-
EMU Europe. We therefore look for evidence that state-specic interest rate shocks
have indeed been transmitted to neighbouring US states. Ideally, the original shock
should be large, exogenous and state specic. We identied the ten largest changes
in annual yield spreads (i.e., those at least two standard deviations above the mean
change).15 All spreads are dened relative to the yield on New Jerseys general
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Table. 3 Public debt as % of public spending
Average Minimum Maximum
51 US states (1990) 15 3 41
EU14 (1996) 158 102 250
Note: EU14 is without Luxembourg.
Sources: Bayoumi et al. (1995) and OECD.
15 Alabama, Michigan, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin in 1982, New Hampshire in 1983,
Texas in 1986, Louisiana in 1987 and Massachusetts in 1990.
obligation bonds, since this is how they are provided by the source. In most cases we
were able to identify events leading to extraordinary increases in yields. Some of
these were plausibly exogenous (the effect of the downturn in the auto industry on
Michigan in 1982, the effect of falling oil prices on Louisiana in 1987). But neither
the recession of the early 1980s nor the oil price decline of the late 1980s had effects
limited to an individual state. For these, sympathetic increases in bond yields
elsewhere could reect that common shock rather than contagion per se.
One case where the shock was large, exogenous to the bond market and plausibly
state specic was Washington State in 1982, where a major power district ran into
serious trouble, servicing bonds issued for the construction of nuclear power plants
(see Box 3). We concentrated on this case. We re-estimated the equations of
Bayoumi et al. (1995), explaining the determinants of yield spreads to control for
observable economic and demographic characteristics of states, and examined the
residuals. 16 Washington State had a large positive residual of 57 basis points in
1982. There was also a large positive residual for Oregon (20 basis points),
consistent with contagion, even after controlling for changes in the debt burden,
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16 Bayoumi et al. (1995) relate the observed yield spread to the level of debt (as a percentage of gross state product, or
GSP), the taxation of state bonds, the rate of unemployment and the strength of constitutional controls on state
borrowing.
Box 3. Whoops! Washington State under nuclear stress
The 1982 shock to the Washington State bond market emanated from problems
with servicing the obligations of the Washington Public Power Supply System
(WPPSS). While these were not general obligation bonds, they represented one
of the largest US bond defaults in history, and there was considerable uncertainty
for a time about whether the state would assume responsibility for these
obligations. WPPSS had been established in 1957 by a consortium of some two
dozen small municipal utilities, whose initial goal was to build a hydroelectric
plant and a steam generating plant, among other projects, to serve the member
utilities. In 1970 WPPSS made a huge leap in scale and technology, beginning
construction of ve nuclear power plants. The small utilities involved had no
experience of large-scale power projects, much less nuclear power. By the early
1980s they had incurred enormous cost overruns. In 1982 the bonds issued to
nance the construction of Nuclear Units 4 and 5 lapsed into default. The event
found immediate reection in the yields on Washington States bonds. These
increased by more than 70 basis points between 1981 and 1982, in the single
largest increase in the ten-year sample.
unemployment, tax rates and so forth. But several other states also had positive
residuals in 1982 at least as large as Oregons, including Delaware, Florida,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota and Rhode Island; it is hard to see why any
of them should have been especially strongly affected by difculties in Washington
State.
Other, unobservable, characteristics of states inuencing yields could conceivably
account for these patterns. To control for unobservables that are constant over time,
we examined the change in the residuals from the yield spreads equation between
1981 and 1982. While the increase in the residual from the spreads equation is large
and positive for Washington (51 basis points), it is now negative for Oregon. Positive
increases of at least 25 basis points in the residual were also observed in Minnesota,
Michegan and Rhode Island; decreases of at least 25 basis points in Pennsylvania as
well as Oregon. As a nal test, we examined states other than Washington that were
also constructing nuclear power plants. Again the results were negative: there were
neither unusually large residuals nor unusually large changes in the residuals in such
states in 1982. Nothing in this analysis provides much evidence of interstate
contagion.
5.2. Econometric analysis
To analyse contagion in the US state and municipal bond market more systemati-
cally, we re-estimated the Bayoumi et al. model, adding a measure of interest rate
shocks in economically contiguous states. 17 If the coefcient on the relevant
measure of economic contiguity, when interacted with interest rates in neighbouring
states, is positive, we have evidence of contagion. The critical step, obviously, is to
measure economic proximity, the economic neighbours from which interest rate
spillovers are most likely to spread. We consider a variety of specications,
appending them to Bayoumi et al.s basic specication (column (1) of Table 4). In
this basic specication, the spread increases with the ratio of debt to gross state
product (heavier debt burdens increasing default risk), declines with the highest
marginal tax rate in the state (a higher tax rate creating a captive market for bonds,
income on which is tax exempt for local investors), rises with the state unemploy-
ment rate (in so far as this implies less tax capacity) and falls with the stringency of
self-imposed scal restrictions (which imply less debt accumulation in the future). All
four regressors included in the basic specication are signicant at conventional
condence levels. 18
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17 Bayoumi et al. are concerned with non-linearities in the relationship between spreads and the level of debt; but while
their non-linear specication allows them to capture the possibility of credit rationing, it also introduces instability into
the model. We therefore focused on a linear version of their preferred specication. The basic results turn out to be
quite similar to those of Bayoumi et al.
18 We also estimated, but do not report, the constant term and a vector of dummy variables for years.
In the rst of our augmented regressions (column (2)), we assume that interest
rate spillovers are most likely to spread from states with similar debt burdens (as a
share of gross state product): markets may interpret higher debt costs in one state as
a signal of impending difculties in states with similar debt levels. For each state in
each year, we calculate the average yield in the four states with the most similar debt
burdens, taking the two states just below and the two states ranked just above, using
the debt/GDP ranking. We treat the average spread in these neighbouring states as
endogenous to reect common shocks as well as spillovers from a state to its
neighbours. In column (2) the coefcient on economic similarity, having the wrong
sign and being insignicantly different from zero, lends no support to the hypothesis
of contagion.
In column (3) we consider a second denition of economic proximity based on
federal aid per capita received. We apply the same procedure as for debt (selecting
the two states immediately above and the two immediately below, using this
ranking). Again we fail to detect signicant contagion. The same result obtains using
a third denition of proximity: the size of the state government measured as the
ratio of state spending to GSP, in column (4).
Columns (5) (7) focus on institutional constraints on scal policies, specically
the stringency of statutory and constitutional balanced-budget and debt-limitation
provisions. The hypothesis, which seems plausible a priori, is that states are most
subject to contagion from other states that use similar institutional procedures to
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Table 4. Bond market contagion in US states
Baseline Similarity: Similarity: Similarity: Similarity: scal restraints
debt/GSP Federal aid govt size
N ‘ 6 N ‘ 7 N ‘ 10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Debt 7.5 13.5 7.5 7.7 3.8 8.3 5.4
(4.4) (2.5) (4.3) (4.6) (1.3) (3.2) (2.7)
Tax 2.2 3.0 1.6 2.1 1.8 3.2 1.3
(2.0) (2.0) (1.4) (1.9) (1.3) (2.7) (1.0)
Unemployment 5.8 6.2 6.3 5.8 6.6 6.1 5.7
(8.8) (8.3) (9.1) (8.3) (7.0) (9.3) (8.4)
Fiscal restraints 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.4 4.4 7.2 6.7
(8.3) (8.0) (8.4) (7.9) (1.5) (4.7) (5.8)
Economic similarity 0.8 0.6 0.1 2.6 1.0 1.0
(1.2) (1.8) (0.4) (2.7) (2.4) (2.0)
SER 19.2 20.8 20.1 19.1 20.7 22.9 20.7
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Debt is debt/GSP. Tax is highest marginal tax rate in states that impose
different tax rates on in-state and out-of-state bonds. Fiscal restraint indexed from 0 (none) to 10
(maximum). Unemployment and scal restraints treated as exogenous. Estimated by 2SLS using as
instruments: average household size, population, change in population, proportion of young and old,
trend GSP. All statistics computed with White heteroscedastic consistent procedure. 380 observations.
Source: Bayoumi et al. (1995) pooled time series (198195) over 33 US states.
formulate their scal policies, since such states would be expected to respond
similarly to similar disturbances. Bayoumi et al. (1995) utilize an index of the
stringency of institutional restraints on scal policy constructed by the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (discussed further in Eichengreen,
1990), which ranges from 1 to 10 in increasing order of severity. Unfortunately,
states are not uniformly distributed over this interval. Of the 38 states in Bayoumi et
al.s sample, seventeen have the maximum score of 10, while another seven have a
ranking of 8 or 9. Hence, using the same procedure as before to identify states
would yield indeterminate or arbitrary results. We therefore consider states only
with rankings N and below, assigning a value of zero for states ranked above, and
then we allow N to take several values from 5 to 9.
The results are in columns (5) to (7). For N = 5, we detect some evidence of
contagion via our economic similarity measure, but for larger values of N the effect
is negative not positive: higher yield spreads in states with similar budgetary
institutions lead to lower yields in states with similar scal arrangements, as if the
markets, when they grow concerned by a states nances, shift their holdings so as to
maintain a balanced portfolio of risks.
We also investigated whether there is contagion between politically similar
states.19 We dene political proximity by the party afliation of the governor, and
construct a proximity dummy that takes a value of 1 when two governors are both
Democrats or both Republicans (and zero otherwise). We then multiply the previous
economic proximity variables by this dummy. Since rerunning the regressions in
Table 4, replacing economic proximity by the above measure of economic and
political proximity, made little difference to the broad pattern of results, we do not
report these results separately. Indeed, in the few cases in which proximity variables
that had previously been insignicant now became signicant, their sign was negative,
again suggesting portfolio diversication rather than contagion. The experience of US
states provides no evidence to justify European-wide scal restraints to protect
against contagious bond market crises.
6. WOULD EXCESSIVE DEFICITS PUSH UP EMU INTEREST RATES?
In EMU, within which capital is mobile, borrowing by one country is likely to have
only a small effect on EMU interest rates: European countries borrow on global
capital markets, relative to which they are individually small. Even if a countrys
actions raise its own interest rates   for example, through a larger risk premium 
there is little reason (contagion apart) why this should imply substantial cross-border
spillovers.
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19 Note that we condition political proximity on economic proximity. Unconditional political proximity is unlikely to
be a sharp classication if about half the governors are Democrats and the other half are Republicans.
6.1.Evidence from the nancial markets
The ideal way to verify this hypothesis would be to build a structural model of
savings and investment for each European country, taking account of the inuence
of both domestic and foreign variables, and distinguishing rest-of-Europe and rest-
of-world magnitudes. This is ambitious to say the least. Here we take the simpler
tack of estimating the reduced-form relationship between interest rates, asking
whether interest rates in a particular European country are affected mainly by own
values, rest-of-Europe values or rest-of-world values.
The straightforward way of implementing this analysis is with Granger causality
tests. Two prior decisions that must be made are what countries and what interest
rates to analyse. But no one would be surprised if our results showed that interest
rates in Luxembourg were affected by interest rates in the rest of the world and in
the rest of Europe, but that interest rates in Luxembourg affected those in neither
the rest of Europe nor the rest of the world. We therefore bias the results against our
own hypothesis by considering the impact of rest-of-world and rest-of-Europe
interest rates on Germany, and the impact of German interest rates on those of the
rest of the world and the rest of Europe.
Similarly, if the analysis concerned itself with co-movements in short-term interest
rates, no one would be surprised if we found evidence of Granger causality running
in both directions, since these timing relationships could reect not just market
spillovers but also the induced policy reaction of central banks, which use short-term
interest rates as policy instruments (Wyplosz, 1990). We therefore focus on the
behaviour of long-term interest rates, whose co-movements are less likely to be
dominated by induced central bank reactions and are more likely to convey
information about market spillovers.20
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Table 5. Causality tests on long-term interest rates, 1973:1 to 1997:5
Germany Germany Europe Europe ROW ROW
causes causes causes causes causes causes
Europe? ROW? Germany? ROW? Germany? Europe?
F-statistic 1.9 1.4 2.2 2.0 3.2 2.4
Probability (%) 3.9 14.4 1.3 2.8 0.0 0.7
Notes: Tests with 12 lags (choice implied by Akaike and Schwartz criteria). Europe is GDP-weighted
average of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, UK. Rest of the
world (ROW) is weighted average of Canada, Japan and USA.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
20 Since long rates are an average of the current and expected future short rates, this does not eliminate the possibility
that the correlations we pick up are in part central bank reactions, but it should minimize that possibility.
We used monthly data, current and lagged up to twelve months, on treasury bond
rates for Germany, the rest of Europe (a weighted average of nine European
countries listed in the note to Table 5, weighted by 1985 GDP) and the world
(proxied by interest rates for the USA, Canada and Japan, again weighted by 1985
GDP). At the 1% level, we can reject all spillovers except that rest-of-world interest
rates affect European interest rates and that rest-of-world interest rates affect
German interest rates: once we control for world interest rates, innovations in
German rates do not affect interest rates in the rest of Europe, and innovations in
rest-of-Europe rates do not affect German rates. The only other relationship that
approaches signicance at the 1% level is the impact of rest-of-Europe rates on
Germany. In each case, then, it is the larger entity whose interest rates affect those
of the smaller economy.
These tests conrm that European countries borrow on a global capital market,
with only small interest rate spillovers between EMU members. They hardly justify
a stability pact to internalize cross-border interest rate spillovers of national scal
policy.
7. WOULD THE PACT INCREASE THE VOLATILITY OF EMU OUTPUT?
We address this question in two steps. We use retrospective evidence to ask how
frequently the Stability Pact would have been binding, and we use counterfactual
simulations to estimate how European output would be affected if binding Stability
Pact ceilings were imposed. Inevitably this exercise is subject to the Lucas critique:
evidence from the past may not be a reliable guide to the future. We go some way
towards answering this objection by adjusting historical debt ratios and interest rates
to the levels likely to prevail at the outset of EMU, basing our simulations on these
adjusted values.
7.1 Retrospective evidence
Figure 1, which shows budget balances for OECD countries since 1955, documents
that the 3% barrier has been breached quite frequently.21 (A similar analysis,
reaching the same conclusions, is provided by Buti et al., 1997). Table 6 shows that
this has been the case 34% of the time for the OECD as a whole, and 40% of the
time in Europe.
Of the 241 cases when the decit was more than 3% of GDP, in only 7 was the
concurrent decline in GDP more than 2%, and in only 28 was it more than 0.75%.
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21 The Maastricht Treaty includes a particular denition of decits that may differ slightly from the data from
International Financial Statistics used in the gure.
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Figure 1. Budget balances (% of GDP)
Source: OECD.
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Table 6. Number of times the decit exceeded 3% of GDP
Number of Total Percentage Recession years
years observations above 3%
Above 0.75% Above 2%
(a) Actual budget (OECD countries, 195596)
Australia 7 23 30.4 1 0
Austria 9 36 25.0 0 0
Belgium 25 26 96.2 3 0
Canada 13 36 36.1 2 1
Denmark 7 36 19.4 1 0
Finland 4 36 11.1 2 1
France 5 33 15.2 1 0
Germany 7 36 19.4 3 0
Greece 16 21 76.2 1 0
Ireland 12 19 63.2 0 0
Italy 30 36 83.3 2 1
Japan 10 36 27.8 0 0
Luxembourg 0 13 0.0 0 0
Netherlands 16 26 61.5 1 0
New Zealand 17 39 43.6 1 1
Norway 0 34 0.0 0 0
Portugal 19 36 52.8 3 1
Spain 14 32 43.8 1 0
Sweden 9 36 25.0 2 1
Switzerland 0 41 0.0 0 0
UK 13 33 39.4 2 0
USA 8 36 22.2 2 1
All countries 241 700 34.4 28 7
EU countries 186 455 40.9 22 4
(b) Budget assuming 1995 debt and 6% interest (196095)
Australia 9 22 40.9 0 0
Austria 12 26 46.2 0 0
Belgium 27 27 100.0 3 0
Canada 21 36 58.3 2 1
Denmark 10 25 40.0 1 0
Finland 4 35 11.4 2 1
France 9 26 34.6 1 0
Germany 21 36 58.3 2 0
Greece 20 21 95.2 1 0
Ireland 13 19 68.4 0 0
Italy 36 36 100.0 1 1
Japan 8 36 22.2 0 0
Luxembourg
Netherlands 12 26 46.2 1 0
New Zealand
Norway 0 21 0.0 0 0
Portugal 17 34 50.0 2 1
Spain 18 32 56.3 1 0
Sweden 10 26 38.5 2 1
Switzerland
UK 12 26 46.2 1 0
USA 17 36 47.2 3 1
All countries 276 546 50.5 23 6
EU countries 221 395 55.9 18 4
Note: Recession years are counted only when the budget decit exceeds 3% of GDP.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook.
Had OECD countries been operating with the Stability Pact, 85% of the decits
that exceeded 3% of GDP would have been judged excessive.22 Put differently, we
can calculate the probability of observing a decit in excess of 3% of GDP conditional
on there being no recession. When a recession is dened as a decline in annual real
GDP of at least 0.75%, the conditional probability is 32%, rising to 34% when
recession is dened as a 2% decline (Table 7). If the past is a guide, we can expect
violations every third year. The constraint imposed by the Stability Pact appears
even more stringent when we realize that the conditional probability of observing a
recession when the budget decit exceeds 3% is only 12% if the recession
corresponds to the 0.75% denition, and 3% for the 2% denition.
One can argue that this record is evidence of the need for constraints to prevent
misbehaviour. Indeed, the common interpretation of the Stability Pact is that it will
lead member countries to aim at budgets that are on average in balance, or slightly
positive. With a budget in surplus at the peak of cycle, it will be possible to use scal
policy as a counter-cyclical tool. What is wrong with that? A rst response  the
second one is presented below in section 8  is that the misbehaviour documented
in Table 7 did not have the dramatic inationary consequences of concern to
proponents of the Stability Pact. Average annual ination for the same sample
of  countries was a relatively moderate 6% over the period. This 6% may be
more  ination than some Europeans would like, but it is hardly the inationary
disaster feared by some EMU-sceptics. Pooling the data for all countries, the
partial  correlation between ination and the budget decit is negative (though
not  signicant), contradicting the assumption that decits are associated with
ination.
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Table 7. Conditional probabilities of excessive decits
Event Conditional upon Conditional probability
Using actual budgets 195596
Decit p 3% No recession (0.75%) 0.32
Decit p 3% No recession (2%) 0.34
Recession (0.75%) Decit p 3% 0.12
Recession (2%) Decit p 3% 0.03
Assuming 1995 debt level and 6% interest rate
Decit p 3% No recession (0.75%) 0.49
Decit p 3% No recession (2%) 0.50
Recession (0.75%) Decit p 3% 0.08
Recession (2%) Decit p 3% 0.02
Source: Authors calculations based on Table 6.
22 Our approach does not exactly match the criteria of the Stability Pact which apply to the previous four quarters,
since we have to look at calendar years (scal data are widely reported only on an annual basis).
7.2. Counterfactual evidence
Can we gauge the consequences of having subjected the European economies to the
Stability Pact for the last 30 years? One approach involves estimating, for the four
largest countries (France, Germany, Italy and the UK), a simple structural model.
The simplest structural macroeconomic model of all, of course, is the textbook
model of an upward-sloping aggregate supply curve and a downward-sloping
aggregate demand curve in the outputprice space. Fiscal policy, among other
variables, shifts the demand curve. We measure the scal stance by the scal
impulse, the year-to-year change in the cyclically adjusted budget decit. This allows
us to minimize the risk that an observed correlation between the decit and output
captures the impact of output on the budget, rather than the impact of the budget
on output, with which we are concerned. Allowing for some inertia in both
relationships, we get the reduced form for output and ination in Table 8.23 In
order to impose the restriction that scal policy has no steady-state effect, we use the
output gap and the change in the ination rate along with the scal impulse
measure. The output gap and the cyclically adjusted budget are taken from the
OECD Economic Outlook.
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23 Note the parallel between these reduced forms and standard VARs, since output and ination both depend on their
own lagged values. The policy inferences that we make from these equations are subject to standard critiques (see
Cochrane, 1994). We nesse some but not all of these objections by using the cyclically adjusted budget as opposed to
the actual budget decit. In addition, we worry about the possibility that the scal impulse variable is systematically
correlated with monetary policy, thus biasing the estimate of its coefcient. A check is to look for subsample stability.
Performing Chow tests with a break in 1985, to account for a change in the policy mix when monetary discipline was
introduced in the EMS, we can reject at the 5% condence level (and in most cases at the 1% condence level) the
hypothesis that the estimates change from one subperiod to the other.
Table 8. Models used for counterfactuals
Coefcient France Germany Italy UK
(t-statistic)
Output Change in Output Change in Output Change in Output Change in
gap ination gap ination gap ination gap ination
(Output gap) 1 0.87 0.35 0.85 0.42 0.87 0.21 0.89 0.58
(6.18) (1.61) (4.52) (3.40) (6.43) (0.61) (7.26) (2.25)
(Ination change) 1 0.31 0.02 0.59 0.15 0.13 0.23 0.15 0.16
(2.38) (0.09) (1.84) (0.71) (1.28) (0.95) (1.73) (0.88)
Fiscal impulse 0.68 0.09 0.58 0.33 0.43 1.28 0.69 0.51
(3.03) (0.26) (2.11) (1.79) (1.73) (2.52) (2.03) (1.07)
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.43 0.51 0.39 0.74 0.12 0.69 0.26
SER 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04
Source: OECD.
Notes: Fiscal impulse is change in cyclically adjusted budget surplus; for France and the UK this variable is
contemporaneous; for Germany and Italy it is lagged one period.
The coefcient on the scal impulse shows the impact of the budget on the out-
put  gap. This coefcient is similar across our sample, ranging from 0.43 in Italy
to 0.68 in France; thus, for each of the four countries, an increase in the cyclically
adjusted surplus by 1% of GDP lowers the output gap by roughly 0.5% of GDP.
These equations are used for counterfactual simulations in which the budget
decit is capped at 3%, as if the Stability Pact had been strictly binding. The top
row of Figure 2 shows the actual budget balance in our four countries (the solid line)
and the counterfactual decits capped at 3% of GDP (the broken line). French
decits would have been different only in the early 1980s, under the rst Mitterrand
government, and in the 1990s. German decits would have been smaller in the wake
of the two oil shocks and to a lesser extent following unication. Italy, the high-
decit country in our sample, would have had very much smaller decits since the
early 1970s, while the UK would have had somewhat smaller decits over the same
period, with the exception of the second half of the 1980s.
The bottom row of Figure 2 shows the effect in our estimated model of restricting
the budget decit to a maximum of 3%. It displays the actual output gap (the solid
line) and the counterfactual gap from a simulation where the decits are capped at
3%, as shown in the top row (the broken line). A fair characterization is that
Stability Pact ceilings on decits would have mattered for output, but not
dramatically so. (Box 4 discusses the extreme cases.) Table 9 compares the average
actual and simulated output gaps. In each country but Germany the output gap is
lower when the decit is capped; while the slowdown is not large, even a fraction of
a percentage point on the annual growth rate can become a big effect when it lasts
over decades. This is shown by cumulating the gaps over the 22-year period
197495: the output losses range from about 5% in France and the UK to 9% in
Italy, signicantly larger than optimistic estimates of favourable output effects to be
expected from EMU. For example, the EU Commissions report One Market, One
Money (1990) set its central estimate of the gross gains at 9.8% of GDP. Further-
more, in each case but Germany, the variability of output as measured by the
standard deviation is higher under the counterfactual. The tempting political-
economy inference is that Germany is particularly insistent on a 3% cap on decits
because historically it alone among the four large EU member states would not have
suffered too seriously from the imposition!
It can be objected that these simulations do not provide a reliable guide to the
future because historical time series do not capture scal conditions as they will exist
at the beginning of EMU. Simulations and conditional probabilities based on
historical data are an imperfect guide to the future because debts are higher now
than historically and because (nominal) interest rates will be lower at the start of
EMU than over the last twenty years. If we adjust debts and interest rates to levels
likely to prevail in 1999 (we use 1995 debt/GDP ratios and nominal interest rates of
6% (2% ination + 4% real interest), this has the predictable effect of raising the
probability of a decit in excess of 3%. The bottom part of Table 7 showed that,
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Budget balance: actual and restricted (deficit not to exceed 3% of GDP)
Output gap: actual and simulated under 3% deficit restriction
Sources: OECD and authors calculations.
Figure 2. Imposing the 3% decit ceiling: the counterfactuals
when a recession is dened as a decline in annual real GDP of at least 0.75%, the
conditional probability is 49% (up from 32% when historical data are used), rising
to 50% (up from 34%) when recession is dened as a 2% decline. This suggests
violations every second year.
We can also revisit our simulations under these assumptions. The top row of
Figure 3 shows (as a fraction of GDP) the actual budget surplus (solid line) and the
counterfactual budget under these assumptions (broken line); predictably, higher
debts would have led to larger decits in the early part of the sample period for
France, Germany and Italy. The bottom row of Figure 3 assumes 1995 debt levels
and a 6% interest rate, and contrasts the actual output gap (solid line) with the
counterfactual simulation under the assumption of a 3% decit ceiling (broken line).
Output losses and increased variability are lower than when actual debt and interest
rate levels are used. In Germany, output is actually higher and only slightly more
variable. Again, our simulation provides unexpected insight into why Germany is
such a strong advocate of the Stability Pact compared to its neighbours.
Had the Stability Pact been in place over previous decades, it would not have had
a devastating impact on the level and variability of output. The future, of course,
will differ from the past; recessions within EMU may be deeper and more protracted
than those of previous decades. Our calculations suggest that they would have to be
very much deeper before the Stability Pact began to make a major difference. But if
an unusually protracted recession qualies as a special circumstance, even then the
Stability Pact may not bind.
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Table 9. Counterfactuals: the effect of a 3% decit ceiling, 197495
Actual output Counterfactual Cumulative output
gap (%) output gap (%) difference (%) by 1995
France Mean 0.7 0.9 4.7
Standard deviation 1.7 2.1
Germany Mean 0.3 0.3 0.2
Standard deviation 2.1 2.1
Italy Mean 0.6 1.1 9.3
Standard deviation 2.3 2.4
UK Mean 0.1 0.3 4.8
Standard deviation 3.1 3.5
Assuming 1995 debt level and 6% interest rate
France Mean 0.8 2.6
Standard deviation 2.0
Germany Mean 0.3 1.3
Standard deviation 2.3
Italy Mean 0.9 6.7
Standard deviation 2.5
UK Mean 0.3 4.9
Standard deviation 3.5
Sources: OECD and authors calculations.
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Budget balance: actual and assuming 1995 debt level and 6% interest
Output gap: actual and including the 3% deficit ceiling at 1995 conditions
Sources: OECD and authors calculations.
Figure 3. Imposing the 3% decit ceiling with 1995 debt levels and a 6% interest rate: the counterfactuals
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Box 4. Extreme recessions
Table 6 reveals that, over the 42 years spanning the period 195596, recessions
deeper than 2% occurred only seven times. These cases are Canada (3.2% in
1982), Finland (7.1% in 1991 followed by 3.6% in 1992), Italy (2.7% in
1975), New Zealand (2.3% in 1991), Portugal (4.3% in 1975), Sweden
(2.2% in 1993) and the USA (2.2% in 1982). Figure 4 shows the average
growth rate for these seven cases during the seven years surrounding the bottom
of the recession. In all cases but the Nordic countries, these were snap recessions
often followed by a rebound the next year. The quick rebound may imply that
OECD recessions are typically rare and very short-lived, the impact effect of
unusual events (the dates point to the oil shocks and bursting bubbles).
Alternatively, it could be that macroeconomic policies have been actively used,
and have successfully limited the extent and duration of the recessions. The
behaviour of budget balances, however, shows that after three years the decits
are still signicantly deeper than before the recession. Would a Stability Pact
have prolonged the recession?
One way of dealing with this issue is to perform a counterfactual experiment.
Since Italy turns out to be among the deep recession cases, this is shown in Figure
1. The deep recession of 1975 is indeed visible. The simulation suggests that,
even if Italy had not been awarded exceptional suspension of the Stability Pact,
the output gap would not have been immensely worse.
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Figure 4. The seven deepest OECD recessions
8. EUROPES FISCAL PROSPECTS
Economic outcomes may also inuence politics. If the Stability Pact prevents
Europes automatic stabilizers from operating and increases the severity of
recessions, it may undermine support for free and open markets. Will member states
manage to attain a budgetary position that on average is in balance or even in
surplus, thereby leaving scope for customary levels of automatic scal stabilization
to be provided in recession without triggering penalties under the Stability Pact?
The answer comes in two parts: how much endogenous scal improvement should
be expected as Europe continues to recover from its mid-1990s recession; and how
extensive will be the discretionary changes in policy that work to reduce budget
decits further?
8.1. Growing out of decits
Current OECD estimates for Europe put 1997 budget decits at 3% of GDP. With
potential output rising at between 2 and 2 1_2% per annum, that much growth is
required to hold the output gap steady and prevent growing budget decits. The
elasticity of the scal balance/GDP ratio with respect to growth is about 0.5%  for
every additional percentage point of growth, the decit ratio falls by half a per cent.
The precise elasticity varies with the structure of the national tax and expenditure
system, although it tends to be higher in Europes smaller, more open economies.
DG II of the European Commission puts these elasticities at 0.8 for the Nether-
lands, and 0.5 for Germany and France, with an average of 0.5 for the EU as a
whole; OECD estimates are similar. IMF staff estimates suggest somewhat higher
average elasticities, of the order of 0.6, with those for Denmark, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the UK around 0.75.24
For Europe to reduce its budget decits from 3.0% in 1997 to 2.5 or 2.6% in
1998 (OECD forecasts; see Table 10) without further discretionary changes in scal
policy, output will have to grow by between 3 and 31_2%. As of mid-1997, the OECD
forecast for 1998 growth in OECD Europe was 2.7%, the J.P. Morgan forecast
2.9%. The IMF forecast for the EU, released in its September 1997 World Economic
Outlook (WEO), split the difference at 2.8%. This is consistent with an average EU
decit ratio of 2.8 or 2.9%, as the WEO forecasts. For the OECD forecast of
2.52.6% to be right, there will have to be substantial discretionary cuts in public
spending or further increases in taxes in 1998.
This implies that, if growth proceeds at the expected pace, Europe will enter
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24 Box 3: The European Unions Stability and Growth Pact, World Economic Outlook (October 1997). Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1995) put the elasticity at 0.51 for the Netherlands, 0.44 for Germany and 0.41 for France (for
consolidated government budgets, including social security funds).
EMU in 1999 with a budget decit somewhat greater than 2%. Assuming growth
continues at 3% a year, it is unlikely that the endogenous response of revenues and
expenditure alone will eliminate budget decits even by 2002. And if a recession
intervenes due to, say, the end of the already long-lived US expansion, even less
progress can be expected.
8.2. Discretionary initiatives
The elimination of budget decits could be accelerated by additional discretionary
tax increases or expenditure cuts. Since 1992 France and Germany have reduced
their cyclically corrected budget decits at an annual average rate of 0.4% of GDP
per year, while in Italy the improvement has been nearly 11_2% per annum. If scal
consolidation continues at this pace, Europes budgets may move substantially
towards balance by about 2002.
There are several reasons to question this rosy scenario. There are already signs of
scal fatigue in Europe after successive years of tax increases, and (in fewer cases)
spending cuts, without readily visible benets. The French elections of mid-1997 are
only the most visible indication of public resistance to further austerity. Consistent
with this diagnosis, European governments have relied on one-off measures 
central bank sales of gold, refundable euro taxes, appropriation for the general
budget of public enterprise pension reserves, and sales of strategic petroleum
reserves   to meet the Maastricht scal criteria for 1997. Moreover, further
discretionary cuts in public spending will depress the rate of growth and therefore
slow the endogenous closing of the scal gap. Nor are demographic trends
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Table 10. OECD forecasts of EU budget balances
(surplus (+) or decit () as a % of nominal GDP)
1995 1996 1997a 1998a
Germany 3.6 3.8 3.2 2.7
France 5.0 4.2 3.2 3.8
Italy 7.0 6.7 3.2 3.8
UK 5.5 4.4 2.8 1.8
Austria 5.3 3.9 3.0 3.4
Belgium 4.1 3.4 2.8 2.7
Denmark 1.9 1.6 0.0 0.7
Finland 5.1 2.6 2.0 1.4
Greece 9.2 7.4 5.2 4.0
Ireland 2.1 0.9 1.2 1.0
Netherlands 4.1 2.4 2.3 1.7
Portugal 5.0 4.0 2.9 2.8
Spain 6.6 4.5 3.0 2.6
Sweden 7.7 3.6 2.1 0.2
EU averageb 5.2 4.4 3.0 2.6
a Projected gures.
b Excluding Luxembourg.
Source: OECD.
favourable: even ten years hence, one begins to worry about the scal consequences
of an ageing population, especially in countries where health services are publicly
provided. OECD (1996) suggests that these effects may become quite substantial
within ten years of the start of EMU, especially for the Netherlands and the Nordic
countries.
None of this rules out further discretionary cuts in spending or discretionary tax
increases that will move Europes budgets towards balance more quickly. In our
estimation, however, taxes are already prohibitively high, and public support for
radical expenditure cuts is absent.
Could decit reduction become more popular because it actually boosts growth?
According to the recent literature on the anti-Keynesian effects of scal policy (e.g.,
Giavazzi and Pagano, 1995), cutting the decit can be expansionary when it boosts
consumer condence and therefore consumer spending. If a country was previously
on an unsustainable scal trajectory, returning to a stable scal path can increase
condence, much as stepping on the brakes of a car hurtling towards a brick wall
can increase the condence of the passengers. This effect is most likely when decit
reduction is signicant, sustained and credible, and when it takes the form of
spending cuts rather than tax increases (Alesina and Perotti, 1995). These, of
course, are precisely the conditions lacking in Europe. Decits of 3% and debts of
70% may be too high, but they are not obviously unsustainable. Refundable euro
taxes and other one-off measures hardly build condence that scal correction will
be sustained. The Jospin governments stated intention of paring the French decit
just enough to qualify for EMU hardly creates condence that the budget will be cut
signicantly from recent levels. So far, the majority of adjustment has taken the
form of increased taxes rather than reduced spending on social programmes and
other entitlements. We should not expect decits to become more popular because
of an anti-Keynesian effect in boosting output.
8.3. Stepping up the pace
Ensuring that Europes scal stabilizers are unconstrained by the Stability Pact
requires stepping up the pace of growth to accelerate endogenous decit reduction.
If Europe grew at 4% a year, the rate projected for the USA in 1997 by the IMF,
this would lop off between 3_4 and 1% of its decit per year through the endogenous
response of revenues, assuming that restraint was exercised on scal spending.
Faster growth without ination requires more exible markets, and more exible
labour markets in particular. The danger here is that excessive energy devoted to
scal consolidation and to the Stability Pact will sap the energies of reformers.
Leaders, having invested most of their political capital in pushing through decit-
cutting measures, may have little left to invest in labour market reform. Truck
drivers, farmers and employees of Air France are already feeling the pinch of
budget cuts; further cuts in sick leave or annual holidays will be one more insult.
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The reduction of hiring and ring costs, among the most important labour market
reforms, will meet with considerable resistance in a slowly growing economy, where
the odds of a dismissed worker nding another job are relatively slim; yet scal
consolidation in Europe is making for slow growth.25
Less rigid preoccupation with scal consolidation will improve the prospects for
labour market reform, for two reasons: European leaders will retain more political
capital to devote to the issue; and a more buoyant macroeconomic environment will
reduce public opposition to the reduction of hiring and ring costs. If successful,
labour market reform will reinforce the buoyancy of the macroeconomic
environment and hasten the pace of scal consolidation.
9. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We have sought in this paper (1) to identify the economic problems that prompted
adoption of the Stability Pact and (2) to assess its costs and benets. Our assessment
is that enforcement of the pact will be relatively loose, but still tight enough to affect
some member states decits. EU ofcials will be reluctant to levy nes and lose
goodwill. Member states will be reluctant to incur nes and suffer embarrassment.
As in most EU affairs, a negotiated settlement just acceptable to both sides is the
likely outcome.26 EU decision-makers will compromise, allowing the 3% ceiling to
be violated. Governments will compromise, eliminating decits that egregiously
violate the Stability Pact. They will modify their scal policies just enough to avoid
forcing their neighbours to impose nes.
9.1. The pacts scal implications hinge on Europes growth performance
If member states quickly move their budgets to balance or surplus, the Stability Pact
will become a non-issue. If they run surpluses of 2% of GDP in expansions, they
will be able to provide customary levels of automatic stabilization in response to an
increase in the output gap of as much as 10% of GDP. It is hard to see that the
Stability Pact could bind.
But except for clearly unsustainable scal trajectories, governments are reluctant
to impose sharp discretionary shifts in the scal balance. In the United States, where
circumstances have been relatively normal, a shift in the scal position of 0.25% of
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25 To date scal progress has been piecemeal. Coe and Snower (1997) argue that this explains both why the results
have been disappointing and why there is public resistance to further reform. And policies (like work sharing and early
retirement) that reduce measured unemployment rather than increase the demand for labour impede faster decit
reduction.
26 Theorists would attribute the prevalence of successful negotiations, and absence of breakdown and sanctions, to the
repeated-game nature of the interaction, the relatively complete nature of the information environment, and the fact
that the EU has built institutions to minimize transaction and negotiation costs over the course of its 40-year history.
GDP is a big deal politically. Throughout Europe, the backlash against scal
austerity is evident. It is not clear that the political will exists to go faster.
If Europe is to eliminate decits and move budgets into surplus, it will have to do
so by outgrowing them. Even if one adopts an optimistic forecast of economic
growth (3% a year), Europes decits will only fall to 2 1_2% by the time EMU begins,
unless other discretionary changes are adopted, which for the above-mentioned reasons
seems unlikely. If, contrary to our expectations, governments attempt to reduce
their decits more quickly, growth will slow. Two pounds of scal effort will thus be
needed to obtain an extra pound of scal results. And if a recession intervenes, little
if any progress will be made.
9.2. Concern with scal stability should not divert attention from labour
market reform
There is a real danger that preoccupation with scal consolidation is hindering
labour market reform, and hindering more general reforms to enhance economic
exibility and boost productivity growth. As explained above, more scal exibility
in the short run may improve the prospects for labour market reform. If successful,
labour market reform will reinforce the buoyancy of the macroeconomic
environment and on balance hasten rather than slow the pace of scal
consolidation.
The remaining implications of our analysis ow from the principle that efcient
intervention should take place as close as possible to the source of the problem in
order to avoid creating more distortions than it eliminates. Those implications are as
follows.
9.3. Better public debt management would permit greater scal exibility
without aggravating bailout risk
If the danger is a nancial crisis, such as struck Mexico in 19945 when investors
refused to roll over the governments maturing debts, the efcient solution is to
lengthen the maturity structure of the debt and smooth the distribution of maturing
issues, not to limit governments scal exibility. Debt runs occur when large
amounts of debt mature suddenly and investors refuse to roll it over. This likelihood
can be minimized by efciently managing the term structure, lengthening maturities
and avoiding bunching.
Lengthening maturities may seem easier said than done for countries with large
debts. However, Table 11 shows no correlation between the size of debts and their
maturity structure. High debts have been no barrier to lengthening maturities for
countries that have made this a priority.
To be sure, countries that lengthen the term structure force themselves to
shoulder a larger term premium. This implies higher taxes, lower spending or larger
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decits, other things equal. But the real danger is not debts so heavy that European
countries will repudiate them, all but unprecedented in peacetime, but rather that
investors will refuse to roll over maturing debts, creating a more serious and sudden
problem that European governments lack the resources to address. If the problem
with lengthening the term structure is that this heightens the temptation to inate,
the appropriate response is to index the debt.
Since less debt is also better than more from this point of view, measures to limit
debt accumulation may also be desirable. The longer and smoother the term
structure, the looser can be application of the Stability Pact, because the risk of
problems in the market for public debt will be lower.
9.4. Better bank regulation would permit greater scal exibility without
aggravating bailout risk
If the problem is that the ECB will come under pressure to intervene when the
crisis spreads to the banking system  because bank failures destabilize the macro-
economy or because the banking system is a channel for contagion  the efcient
policy response is to strengthen the banks, not to limit scal exibility. This was the
lesson drawn by the Argentine government from the countrys debt-cum-banking crisis
in 1995, when Mexicos bungled devaluation led investors to withdraw their funds,
placing Argentinas bank system at risk. In response, the government raised capital and
liquidity requirements for the banks; by limiting their ratio of liquid liabilities to liquid
assets, it limited the resources that had to be raised in the event of a run.27
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Table 11. Structure of central government debts in Europe
Debt as % Short-term as Foreign-held Year
of GDP % of debt as %
domestic debt of total
Austria 52.4 0.4 19.1 1993
Belgium 131.1 21.1 15.8 1993
Finland 38.7 27.9 65.1 1992
France 38.7 42.4 n.a. 1994
Germany 33.7 3.9 48.7 1994
Greece 104.9 50.0 21.5 1992
Italy 105.8 39.4 14.5 1992
Luxembourg 3.9 45.5 6.9 1992
Netherlands 61.6 4.9 21.3 1994
Norway 23.2 35.4 29.9 1992
Spain 41.3 52.7 17.0 1992
Sweden 66.7 15.3 50.5 1994
UK 34.0 29.6 17.1 1992
Sources: Government statistics; IMF.
27 For further details on the spread of instability from Mexico to Argentina and how the Argentine government
responded by strengthening the position of its banking system, see Caprio et al. (1997).
In Europe, the fear is that the costs of a bailout of a national banking system
would be borne by the residents of the whole EMU zone, not just the offending
country, inducing moral hazard. If so, the solution is to raise capital and liquidity
requirements for the banks   perhaps to even higher levels than mandated by the
BIS Accords (which are designed for countries with their own central banks). If
European policy-makers believe that the banks investments in government bonds
are a threat to nancial stability, the efcient solution is to limit the banks ability to
hold such bonds, not to limit governments ability to issue them. The BIS allows
banks to adjust their capital holdings for risk using proprietary models; if European
ofcials feel that those models underestimate the risks of holding public debt
(because they neglect externalities associated with, inter alia, contagion and
systematic risk), then the efcient policy response is to change how those capital
standards are calculated, not to prevent governments from issuing debt. More
generally, if the underlying problem is instability in the banking system, national
governments and the EU should tighten supervision and inspection of Europes
banks rather than placing scal authorities in a straitjacket. The stricter is prudential
supervision and the higher are capital and liquidity requirements, the looser can be
the Stability Pact, because the risk to the banking system will be less.
We conclude that the Stability Pact is a minor nuisance if European countries
succeed in moving their budgets into balance or, better, into surplus, making room
for their automatic stabilizers to work. But if their decits remain right up against
their 3% reference values when EMU begins, the pact becomes more of a problem.
Since much of Europe lacks the appetite for radical scal consolidation, reducing
decits means outgrowing them. Here labour market exibility is key. In this
connection, the Stability Pact should not be allowed to become a diversion. Europe
needs more attention to labour market reform, not single-minded preoccupation
with scal retrenchment. If its politicians do not devote all their political capital to
contentious scal cuts, they will have more resources to push through needed labour
market measures. And to the extent that debt management and nancial sector
reforms encourage them to apply the Stability Pact more exibly, faster decit-
reducing growth, not interrupted by recessions, becomes easier to sustain.
Discussion
Charles Bean
London School of Economics
This paper could just as easily have been entitled The costs and benets of the
Stability Pact. Eichengreen and Wyplosz conclude that the benets are probably
minimal, and could have been achieved in other ways. I agree. They also argue that
the costs will be small. I am less convinced.
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As far as the benets go, Eichengreen and Wyplosz list ve possibilities. The rst,
and potentially most important, is to prevent inationary debt bailouts. Of course,
there is already a no-bailout clause in the Maastricht Treaty, but questions remain
as to whether that is an entirely credible commitment on the part of the signatories.
If, say, Italy were to nd itself unable to fund its debt obligations, is it really likely
that its European partners would not come to its aid? The rst point to note is that,
if a bailout did happen, the European Central Bank would not be the main agency
involved; rather it is the IMF and national governments that would have to organize
any rescue package. The ECB enters the picture only if there is a risk of contagion
and a ight to liquidity that threatens the stability of the nancial system. Here the
authors undertake a brave attempt to draw lessons from US experience. The scal
position of US states is so different from that of the EU nations that it is tempting to
dismiss the exercise as irrelevant, but one should look where one can for evidence.
In this respect, surely the Latin American experience of the 1980s, and that of the
Far East today, provide better laboratories for investigating contagion effects.
Clearly, excessive debt levels generating nancial instability are a cause for concern,
but provided any injection of liquidity by the ECB is temporary, and is withdrawn
as nancial stability is restored, it need have no effect on ination. Furthermore, the
risk of such a scenario can be reduced in a sharper and more direct way by limiting
the exposure of nancial intermediaries to risky sovereign debt.
As for the other arguments for limiting debt and decits, the argument that high-
debt countries will press for higher ination so as to reduce the real value of their
outstanding debt obligations ignores the fact that the members of the Governing
Council of the European System of Central Banks are not supposed to act as
representatives of narrow national interests. Moreover, if there were genuine
concern that this might happen, the voting rights of high-debt countries could be
limited, as suggested by Paul De Grauwe.
As far as dealing with the political bias towards excessive decits goes, there is no
reason why this should be a matter for supranational action. If indeed it is the case
that decits are excessive, and have the adverse effects enumerated by the authors 
all of which are internal to the country  then national governments could tie their
hands by passing into law a Code for Fiscal Stability that constrains scal policy along
appropriate lines. Such a code is presently in force in New Zealand and is currently
being introduced in the United Kingdom. There is a case for supranational action
only if there are adverse spillovers from these excessive decits on to other countries.
Indeed, spillovers on to interest rates provide the fourth argument for constrain-
ing decits. Aside from the fact that such spillovers appear to be small  although in
their empirical work the authors confuse a lack of statistical signicance with a lack
of economic signicance  there is surely a widespread misunderstanding of the
theoretical case here, which the authors do a service by exposing. If a country
chooses to borrow beyond the point at which the opportunity cost of funds equals
the (social) returns, the costs of that inefciency are borne by the taxpayers of the
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borrowing country. At most there is a distributional issue, as countries that are net
lenders (borrowers) will gain (lose) from higher interest rates. As most European
countries have a net asset position that is quite close to balance, such distributional
considerations are marginal.
Finally, as far as the policy co-ordination argument goes, the literature shows that
scal policy could just as easily be too tight as too loose, and that consequently the
Stability Pact is ill-designed for achieving a more efcient outcome.
Let me now turn to the costs of the pact. Its architects believe that countries will
be sufciently far-sighted and will run surpluses in good times, so as to give room for
the automatic scal stabilizers, and other discretionary scal action, in bad times. To
anyone who has observed the shameless scal bribery of the electorate by successive
UK governments as election time draws near, this is hopelessly Panglossian. The
problem with the pact as presently framed is that it is all stick and no carrot;
rewarding good scal behaviour in booms rather than, or in addition to, punishing
bad behaviour in slumps would surely make better sense. This could easily be done
by relating payments to the EU budget or the distribution of euro seigniorage to
scal positions.
Eichengreen and Wyplosz seem to subscribe at least partially to the Panglossian
view, while simultaneously arguing that sufcient discretion exists to ensure that
nes would in any case not be imposed. Surely there is an inconsistency here  if
governments do not believe nes will be imposed in bad times, why should they run
scal surpluses in good times?
The authors undertake an interesting counterfactual exercise in asking how
different the past would have looked if the Stability Pact had been in force over the
past 22 years, and conclude that the cumulated output losses for France, Italy and
the UK would be somewhere between 5 and 9% of GDP, i.e. the equivalent of an
annual loss of 1_4 
1_
2 % of GDP, which is signicant but not disastrous. However, their
methodology is awed in that, to carry out the simulations, they calculate the
historical excess decit and then assume that this is the amount by which the
cyclically corrected decit (their scal impulse measure) also needs to change. But in
practice a one percentage point decline in the cyclically corrected decit requires a
reduction in the actual decit of more than one percentage point because the scal
contraction lowers taxes and boosts transfers. In fact, using the estimates in the
paper for the elasticities of output with respect to the decit, and of the decit with
respect to output (Table 11), suggests that the output losses are at least half as much
again as the authors suggest.
Looking forward, the authors note that further scal retrenchment is required if
member countries are to have sufcient room to allow the scal stabilizers to
operate, and for any supplementary discretional scal action, during recessions.
What to my mind the authors do not bring out sufciently clearly is that improve-
ments in the scal position due purely to faster cyclical growth will be of little help
here, since what is required is an improvement in the cyclically corrected scal
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position; at best, more robust cyclical growth buys a little more time. Instead what is
required is a permanent and sustainable increase in the level of output  something
that is harder to achieve.
Finally, the most serious criticism of the Stability Pact, and indeed of the drive
towards the single currency, is that it has served as a distraction from tackling some
of Europes more serious structural problems: in particular, high and persistent
unemployment and the need for pension reform. As far as unemployment goes,
some people argue that monetary union will hasten labour market reform as
countries will no longer have access to the quick x of devaluation. But since
Europes unemployment is primarily structural rather than cyclical, devaluation is in
any case only a temporary solution. Furthermore, the political reality of labour
market reform is that it is easier to reduce ring costs, cut unemployment benets,
etc. in a booming economy. Getting the agreement of the various social partners to
such policies will therefore be easier if macroeconomic policies are free to support
the structural reforms, thus ensuring the gains from reform come hard on the heels
of the necessary pain. Having greatly reduced their room for manoeuvre on the
monetary front, European governments are now in danger of doing the same on the
scal front.
As far as pension reform goes  one of the biggest challenges on the horizon for
most European governments  the Maastricht debt numbers make no allowance for
the accumulated pension obligations under the current pay-as-you-go arrangements.
Given increasing longevity and the fall in the birth rate, the tax rate necessary to
nance these obligations is set to become unacceptably high, and greater reliance on
funded schemes is unavoidable. However, a major problem with switching from an
unfunded to a funded arrangement is that at least one generation of taxpayers has
to bear the double burden of saving for their own pensions as well as paying for the
pensions of their parents. The equitable way of undertaking the transition is, of
course, for the government to borrow to nance the pensions of the nal generation
of pay-as-you-go retirees, so that the burden is borne by future taxpayers as well as
current ones. The Stability Pact makes this all but impossible to do.
Stefan Gerlach
Bank for International Settlements, Basle
For those of us who have read past papers by Barry Eichengreen and Charles
Wyplosz, this paper comes as no surprise: it provides a clear and careful analysis of
an important policy question, and draws a provocative conclusion that the Stability
Pact is something between a minor nuisance and a major problem. In my
comments, I argue that the paper underestimates the risks and consequences of a
public debt crisis and the likelihood of interest rate spillovers, that it downplays the
inationary consequences of high public debt, and that it is thus too quick to
conclude that the Stability Pact (SP) is not desirable.
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The paper starts with a review of a number of claims that have been made in
support of the SP. After analysing each in turn, the authors conclude that only two
of them may be valid: (1) the SP could reduce the likelihood of an inationary debt
bailout, and (2) it could limit the risk of interest rate spillovers within the euro area.
The authors argue that whether the SP actually will have these benets is an
empirical question, and they go on to analyse these two claims more thoroughly
before rejecting them. For reasons of space, I focus much of my discussion on their
analysis of these arguments in favour of the Stability Pact. I conclude with a brief
analysis of why the SP could be helpful in reducing inationary pressures  an
argument that the authors reject without much discussion.
Debt bailouts
While the authors recognize that the SP may reduce the likelihood of a public debt
crisis and therefore the need for an inationary bailout, they do not believe that in
practice this justies the pact. They study the extent to which banks experienced
losses on their real-estate lending in past banking crises, and compare these losses
with banks exposure to government debt. They argue that banks actually hold
relatively little public debt and note that any debt crisis would only partially reduce
the value of government bonds.28 They therefore conclude that a public debt crisis
is not likely to endanger the banking system. The authors argue, furthermore, that
past banking crises have been deationary rather than inationary, and emphasize
that any liquidity infusion by the central bank in a future crisis is likely to be
temporary.
I have several reservations regarding these arguments. First, I doubt that past
banking crises that were caused by poor real-estate loans provide much information
about the likelihood that a public debt crisis would trigger a banking crisis. One
reason for this is that real-estate loans, in contrast to bonds, are not marked-to-
market and it is therefore easier for banks to keep problems related to such loans out
of the public view for some time, which may reduce the risk of a bank run. Some
opaqueness provided that it is temporary and that the supervisory authorities are
kept informed at all times may be desirable from a systemic perspective, since it
gives banks some time to resolve problems without at the same time having to
endure a crisis of condence. Second, I have some concerns regarding the authors
data on the exposure of the banking system. My colleagues Bob McCauley and Bill
White have recently presented some calculations suggesting that banks are about
twice as exposed as Table 2 of this paper suggests.29 If this is correct, it seems that
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28 It is implicit in the paper that a public crisis, if it were to occur, would take the form of a forced exchange of short-
term for longer-term debt, perhaps with a reduction of the applicable interest rate. Thus, a debt crisis would only
partially reduce the value of the debt.
29 See McCauley and White (1997, table 20, p. 377).
the authors may have underestimated the consequences of a public debt crisis for
the stability of the banking sector. Third, while banking crises may well be
deationary, there are of course many other reasons  in particular, their effect on
output and employment  why they should be avoided.
More fundamentally, however, I think the authors underestimate the potential
systemic implications of a forced conversion of the public debt. It is important to
recognize that a drastic fall in the value of government bonds could lead to a
systemic crisis even if banks hold no public debt directly. A collapse of bond prices
may lead to a collapse of non-bank nancial institutions that are counterparties
to banks in a number of markets. Thus, any crisis that erupted would spread
to  banks sooner or later. Moreover, for a systemic crisis to start, it is not necessary
for a public debt crisis actually to occur. The mere suspicion that banks hold
government bonds of questionable value may lead depositors to withdraw funds and
counterparties to take their business elsewhere, which in turn could trigger a
nancial crisis.
Interest rate spillovers
The second argument that the authors consider to be potentially correct is that the
SP could reduce the risk of interest rate spillovers. Such spillovers could arise if, for
instance, overly lax scal policies in one country lead to higher interest rates in other
countries, or if a condence crisis in one country triggers condence crises
elsewhere. The authors argue that, since governments are price-takers in integrated
nancial markets, it is difcult to believe that there would be large spillovers. They
also provide some econometric evidence suggesting that there is little evidence of
such spillovers among individual US states and in Europe.
However, I think it questionable whether the US evidence contains much
information relevant to the likelihood of interest spillovers in Europe. First, debt/
income ratios are much smaller for individual US states than for European
countries. Second, there are apparently no cases of a near-default in the US data,
and it is therefore difcult to see what can be learned from them.30 Third, since the
income on bonds issued by the state of residence tends to be tax free, there are
strong clientele effects in the markets for state debt in the USA, which are likely to
reduce the possibility of interest rate spillovers. Since the US data are likely to be
uninformative, it would be instructive to consider whether there were spillover
effects in other episodes in which there was some uncertainty in the market for
public debt. One episode of potential interest is the period surrounding the
referendum in Quebec at the end of October 1995.
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30 The same argument would seem to hold for the European data.
Ination and the public debt
The standard justication of the SP it that it is necessary to ensure the achievement
and maintenance of price stability in the euro area. Viewed from this perspective, it
is particularly striking that the authors apparently nd no merit in the argument that
large public debts can be inationary.
There are at least two reasons why large public debts may be inationary. The
rst is that large public debts carry with them a temptation to reduce the real value
of the debt by generating an unexpected burst of ination. However, since a
signicant part of the public debt in many countries is of short maturity, and since
some borrowing may be in foreign currency, the practical relevance of this
argument is negligible, at least in Europe.31 The second argument is based on the
observation that the maintenance of low ination may sometimes conict with the
stability of the debt/GDP ratio. Suppose that the ECB cares about ination and
nancial stability, and therefore the size of the public debt. A tightening of
monetary policy not only raises the real interest rate (and hence debt service), it also
reduces real growth (hence, at given tax rates, raising the primary decit). Higher
decits lead to the accumulation of higher debt in the numerator, and lower output
directly reduces the denominator: through both channels, tighter monetary policy
will increase the debt/GDP ratio.
The monetary policy implications of this stem from the fact that at any point in
time there are likely to be differences of opinion between the members of the
Governing Council of the ECB regarding the appropriate stance of policy: some
members might argue for a tightening of policy, others might prefer to leave interest
rates unchanged, while still others might view a relaxation of policy as appropriate.
While it is not clear what, in practice, the decision-making process in the ECB will
be like, it is plausible that policy will be heavily inuenced by the views of the
average member. The fact that a tightening of policy is likely to worsen the debt
situation and increase the risk of nancial instability may lead the average council
member to be marginally less willing to tighten, or marginally more willing to relax,
monetary policy. Large public debts could therefore impart an ination bias to the
ECBs monetary policy. While it is difcult to speculate how large this ination bias
could be, a few per cent seems plausible. If correct, this would provide a good
reason for limiting public debt in Europe.
General discussion
Maurice Obstfeld thought that Canadian experience, more than that of the United
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31 Persson et al. (1996) show that an increase in ination would impact positively on government nances in Sweden.
However, these gains stem not from the real depreciation of the government debt and increased seigniorage, but
rather from nominal features of the tax and transfer system.
States, could provide a useful guide to the future evolution of the Stability Pact.
Canadian provinces have substantial debts and also greater leeway in their nancing
methods. One could test the validity of the bailout story by studying the debt ratios
of provinces: do higher levels of debt push up the provincial interest rates?
Importantly, such a test should concern itself with real interest rates rather than
nominal ones. Finally, he noted that high growth is not a panacea for the problem
of scal adjustment. A buoyant economy may allow us to postpone the hard
decisions needed on the scal front, but it cannot do so indenitely.
Kenneth Rogoff felt that concerns regarding the anti-inationary ability of the
European Central Bank were exaggerated. In his opinion, the real issue was the
ECBs regulatory ability: in particular, its ability to co-ordinate and supervise banks.
J×urgen von Hagen, in contrast, doubted that the ECB could always
resist the pressure to inate away debt. Regardless of the constitution of the ECB, it
may be tempted to allow higher ination in exceptional circumstances. He noted
that the deterioration of decits is often caused not by the scal stance, but as in the
case of Italy, by increased transfer payments and high interest rates. Moreover,
judging from experience, scal restrictions in periods of recession tend to result in
cutbacks in some crucial areas, such as infrastructure and education. If volatility in
expenditure patterns in these sectors is costly, scal restrictions imposed by the
Stability Pact will prove to be more than just diversions. Finally, simulations suggest
that the impact of negative scal stimuli on an economy depends on the scal stance
in other countries as well. Fiscal stimuli that affect many countries could have more
pronounced effects than isolated ones.
Olivier Blanchard wondered how austere a government needed to be in the long
run in order to keep room for manoeuvre against an occasional but signicant
recession. How much below the 3% level would the budget decit have to be to
provide this cushion? He expressed the view that scal restrictions imposed by the
Stability Pact may lead to structural activism: reform and intervention in areas other
than monetary and scal policy, most notably in labour markets. The UK had
carried this out successfully, while France had not, so the results could well be
mixed. In Klaus Zimmermanns opinion, the 3% decit criterion was chosen to
exclude Italy, which was somewhat unfair. If Italys shadow economy were taken
into account, we would come to a different judgement of its true position.
Andrew Rose thought the paper was concerned excessively with the
size of the public debt, whereas the Stability Pact is designed around budget decits.
Torben Andersen thought that the Stability Pact focuses on the decit norm because
of perceived political myopia. Perhaps politicians do not realize that large persistent
decits lead to higher debt levels. He argued that the paper captured only the effects
of discretionary changes in scal policy and left out the automatic stabilizers.
Automatic stabilizers play a signicant role in European economies, and if they
were eliminated by the decit criterion, the Stability Pact might prove to be costlier
than expected.
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Paul De Grauwe also stressed the role of automatic stabilizers. The Stability Pact
aimed to move countries towards balanced budgets. It was not clear that the 3%
deviation from balanced budget would provide enough room for automatic
stabilizers to work properly. If not, the Stability Pact would restrict the efcacy of
automatic stabilizers. Second, behind the Stability Pact lay the assumption that
default and bailout risks were greater under monetary union. One could argue, to
the contrary, that Italys default risk is higher outside the EMU than inside it.
Likewise evidence suggests that most bailouts have been carried out between
countries that are not part of a common currency area.
Richard Portes stressed that the ECB denitely can intervene when liquidity
problems are at stake. However, as far as solvency is concerned, there is nothing
in the monetary process that requires European taxpayers to solve other countries
solvency problems. Robert McCauley felt that the paper ignored the consider-
able structural change that had occurred in the last 25 years. For instance, the
change in the German long-term interest rate was certainly affected by German
unication.
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